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Abstract
There is a large body of literature on the effect of educational resources
on student performance, such as teacher qualification, class size, and physi-
cal resources in school. It is dominated by empirical studies which often find
ambiguous effects of resource spending on student outcomes. The unique
contribution of this paper is the provision of a framework to study educa-
tional production with differentiated input factors, which allows for closed-
form solutions. We try to interpret the empirical findings on the basis of a
simple theoretical model of educational production: Class size, employed
school resources and student effort are endogenously determined in order
to account for differences in educational achievement. We also discuss the
choice of integrated vs. segregated classes. Optimum class size and school
quality increase with higher discipline, while in equilibrium overall class-
room disruption is equal in all classes.
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1 Introduction
This paper lays out a theoretical framework, which allows the analysis of schools’
and students’ incentives to engage optimally in educational production. The stu-
dents’ motivation in studying is straightforward: They profit from their educa-
tional achievement and their accumulated human capital. However, also society
profits from the individuals’ education via positive externalities and the possibil-
ity to tax away some of the gain in wages due to higher productivity.
From an economic point of view, most important in the analysis of education is
the elaboration and the solution of the main trade-offs faced by individuals. The
attempt of this paper is to model the sequence of decisions in the educational sys-
tem in order to be able to scrutinize the interaction between the different factors
in educational production. We also discuss the case of segregated vs. integrated
classes with respect to efficient educational production. For this purpose, the
research by Lazear (2001), who develops a theory of optimum class size, and
Wo¨ssmann (2002), who takes an institutional approach to educational produc-
tion, are merged to an integrated model of education with closed-form solutions.
Decision makers are the government via schools and students. Studying effort
and school quality are the choice variables constituting the core of the model.
Schools and teachers act on behalf of society as a whole and are not modelled to
be independent utilitymaximizers. It turns out that the empiricallymissing effect
of class size on educational achievement is well explained by our model. Con-
cerning the impact of classroom computers, teacher training and relative teacher
pay, our basic model is more optimistic than what the empirical literature sug-
gests. The differencemight be due to the unobservability of student types and the
resulting misallocation of students to different class types. We will argue against
this objection and consider a reconciliationwith empirical ecidence in section 6.2.
As already mentioned, effort choices by both students and schools are discussed
without considering teacher incentives explicitly. This paper proceeds with sec-
tion 2 discussing related literature. Section 3 gives an outline of our model with
homogeneous students and discusses the process of educational production. In
section 4, we present the centralized solution to the school’s and the student’s
optimization problems as a benchmark. Section 5 describes the individual deci-
sions in the order which is implied by the backward induction solution method.
In section 6, an extension of the model is given, in which the optimum treatment
of differentiated student types is discussed; section 7 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Most of the worldwide policy discussions on school performance concentrate on
the factors influencing education at school. Among the schooling inputs gener-
ally considered to be important are class size, teacher qualification and expendi-
ture on physical resources (cf. Hanushek, 2002). One of the first influential stud-
ies to point out that pure input-based education policies do not make a difference
is by Hanushek (1994). He conducts a series of literature reviews, which support
the conclusion that increased spending in general and smaller class sizes in par-
ticular do not systematically lead to improved student achievement. Hanushek
(2001) concludes that educational policy decisions should not focus on school re-
sources because the impact of resources on student achievement is unknown at
the time. Addressing the question whether new technologies, such as computer
aided instruction, improve learning, Angrist and Lavy (2002) find that there is no
such influence.
Rice (2003) describes the importance of various teacher attributes in educational
production. Hanushek (1996) argues that there is no consistent evidence linking
student achievement to teacher characteristics. However, it could be the case that
they are important but that variation in teacher quality is driven by factors that
are difficult to measure. Hence, identification of teacher fixed effects requires
matched student-teacher data with observations on student achievement and
teachers over multiple years. Rockoff (2004) finds that a one standard deviation
increase in teacher quality raises students’ test scores by approximately 0.1 stan-
dard deviations in reading and math. Moreover, also teacher experience adds to
student performance: Reading test scores differ by 0.17 standard deviations on
average between beginning and experienced teachers. Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain (2005) find that teachers are a major determinant of student performance,
but do not describe teacher quality in terms of specific qualifications and charac-
teristics. Their research identifies teacher quality as the most important school-
related factor influencing student achievement. They conclude from their anal-
ysis of 400,000 students in 3,000 schools that, while school quality is an impor-
tant determinant of student achievement, the most important predictor is teacher
quality. In comparison, class size, teacher education, and teacher experience play
a small role. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) and Sanders and Rivers (1996) also argue
that the single most important factor affecting student achievement is teachers.
Further, they contend that lower achieving students are the most likely to ben-
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efit from increases in teacher effectiveness. However, explicitly testing teachers
before hiring them seems not to be able to select high quality teachers: Inquiring
the effect of teacher tests on quality, Angrist and Guryan (2003) find that states in
the U.S. which introduced teacher tests ended up paying higher teacher salaries
with no measurable increase in teacher quality. This suggests that tests are rather
a barrier to entry than an effective quality screen.
An important determinant of the per-student cost of schooling is class size. A
challenge to the view that resourcesdo notmatter has arisen by the STAR (Student
Teacher Achievement Ratio) study conducted in the state of Tennessee. There,
smaller class sizes with randomly assigned students and teachers resulted in sig-
nificantly enhanced achievement for children (cf. Mosteller, 1995). Studies based
on the STAR experiment find that class size has a significant effect on test scores:
Reducing class size from 22 to 15 in the early primary grades increases both math
and reading test scores by ca. 0.2 standard deviations (cf. e.g. Krueger, 1999).
Angrist and Lavy (1999) observe that in their data the observed association be-
tween class size and student achievement is always perverse. However, using a
natural experiment in Israel, they find that reductions in class size induce a sig-
nificant and substantial increase in the students’ math and reading achievement.
In Mishel and Rothstein (2002), Hanushek and Krueger lay out their interpreta-
tion of basically the same evidence. Notwithstanding their difference of opin-
ion, there is some consensus. The most important is that both agree that smaller
classes can matter in some circumstances. There are a number of explanations to
account for the inconsistencies among the non-experimental studies on the effect
of class size, namely poor measurement of key variables, and model specification
issues.
3 Outline of the Model
Our model treats teacher effort in class as a public good subject to negative
spillovers from each of the students. It reproduces education decisions by stu-
dents and schools. For simplicity, we assume that human capital can be traded
in for a money wage on a one-to-one basis. Thus, human capital is the nume´raire
good in the model.
A school and students are the two actors. The basic idea behind the economic
model of education in schools is that the involved actors maximize the differ-
ence between their benefits and their costs, i.e. their net benefits. Students earn
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the market value of their human capital which is taxed at rate τ and bear their
individual effort cost. The school maximizes its net surplus from the individu-
als’ human capital minus the cost of its school resources. The exact form of the
school’s objective and its discussion follow below in the context of optimum class
size and schooling resource spending choice.
For the sake of simplicity, we take the income tax rate τ as exogenously given.
The decisions in the model are taken in four stages as depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1Timeline of decisions in the model.
1
2
3
4
School chooses expenditures r per class;
School chooses class size m;
Students choose studying effort e;
Students/workers earn wage.
In the first stage, schools decide on their resources spent. Schooling resources
comprise physical resources as well as the quality and education of the hired
teachers. In the second stage, schools optimize class size. By separating the
expenditure and class size choice of schools, we reproduce the actual decision
process in autonomous schools, which typically face exogenous restrictions con-
cerning their infrastructure and physical resources but are free to choose class
size in the short run. In the third stage, students maximize their net benefit from
schooling by choosing the right amount of effort they are willing to make. In
the fourth stage, the acquired human capital in the form of skills is translated
into wages on the labor market. This sequence of decisions can be solved by
backward induction in order to reach a subgame perfect equilibrium.
A student’s direct productivity h from studying during a certain time period is
a function of her own effort e and employed school resources per class r. For
simplicity, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for education:
h = eαrβ α + β < 1.
Student effort e is controlled by the student herself, reflecting her motivation,
time and engagement devoted to learning. r is the amount of educational re-
sources employed in teaching. Contained in this variable are the physical re-
sources in a classroom, such as computers, but also a teacher’s education, techni-
cal as well as methodical. These resources are the school’s choice variable which
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it can commit to before class size and student effort are chosen by the respective
decision-maker. The assumption of diminishing returns to scale reflects addi-
tions to education being incresingly hard to produce.1
Formal classroom schooling is a public good subject to congestion. Educational
resources spent by a school are basically non-rival. However, there is a conges-
tion effect as in Lazear (2001), since every student has a certain probability of
disrupting in class, such that it is not possible to spend all the time at school
studying. The ability of a student to learn something in class thus depends on
the behavior of others in the same class. If one student disrupts classwork, the
entire class suffers; the teacher’s and the other students’ concentration is diverted
from studying. Let pi be the probability that a student is not misbehaving at any
moment in time, pi ∈ [0, 1[. Then, the probability that all students in a class of
size m are behaving is pim, which is also equal to the proportion of schooling
time during which students are effectively studying. Thus, human capital P is
produced according to
P = ph, (1)
where the productive time in school, p = pim. Of course, there are also positive
spillovers provided by the students to one another. However, the range of class
size where adding students produces net positive externalities is not relevant for
an optimizing school. Since an increase in class size reduces cost per student,
an optimizing school will increase class size up to the point where additional
students have negative effects on each others.
4 Centralized Solution
As a benchmark, we solve the optimum education production problem from a
social planner’s point of view. There are social benefits from education which
consist of (1) an increase in workers’ productivity and (2) positive externalities
from education.2 Total costs consist of the students’ effort cost and the cost of
resources employed in schooling. The social net benefit from education per class
writes as
V# = max
e,m,r∈R+
{
ρmpimeαrβ −mcSe− cTr
}
, (2)
1Note that in equations 6 and 8 effort costs are assumed to be linear, such that additional effort coneas
at equal cost but is only decreasingly effective.
2On the evidence of externalities of education cf. e.g. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Lochner and
Moretti (2001) and Dee (2003).
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where ρ > 1 collects all private and external benefits from education and cS
and cT denote (constant) unit costs of student effort and educational resources,
respectively. The first-order conditions with respect to m, r, and e write as
m : ρpimeαrβ + ρmpim lnpieαrβ
!
= cSe,
r : ρβmpimeαrβ−1
!
= cT ,
e : ραmpimeα−1rβ
!
= mcS.
The optimum values for class size, resource spending, and student effort follow
directly:
m# = −
1− α
lnpi
, (3)
r# =
[( α
cS
)α ( βm#
cT
)1−α
ρpim
#
] 1
1−α−β
, (4)
e# =
[( α
cS
)1−β ( βm#
cT
)β
ρpim
#
] 1
1−α−β
. (5)
5 Student Effort vs. School Quality
In the decentralized decision process, schools and students optimize their efforts
individually. We find the equilibrium values of r, e, m, and P by solving the
model backwards.
5.1 Student Effort
As mentioned above, students have their effort as choice variable which they use
to maximize their net benefit from education. A student S chooses her level of
effort e given the labor income tax rate τ, school resources r and class size m. The
student’s benefit BS
BS = (1− τ) P = (1− τ) peαrβ.
The costs of a student’s effort, CS are assumed to be linear in effort:
CS = cSe, (6)
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where cS is a cost parameter. These costs represent opportunity costs of the time
spent in class and at home and the psychic energy of learning. A student maxi-
mizes her net benefit NBS = BS − CS with respect to the level of effort e,
e∗ = arg max
e∈R+
{
(1− τ) peαrβ − cSe
}
.
By increasing her effort, a student raises both educational achievement and total
effort cost. The first-order condition yields the optimal level of effort for any
given tax rate, class size and level of resource spending by the schools:
e∗ =
( α
cS
(1− τ) prβ
) 1
1−α
.
Since school quality and student effort complement each other, student effort
increases in the school’s resource spending and decreases in class size. An in-
crease in the income tax rate reduces the individual benefit from achievement
and therefore leads to a decrease in student effort.
5.2 School Quality
5.2.1 Incentives to Schools
The gross benefit to students is given by their human capital which they acquire
at school: (1− τ) P. In our model, also teachers benefit from their students’ ed-
ucational success: Be it via performance pay or self motivation. At the moment,
we simply assume that a teacher’s/school’s benefit from education is summa-
rized as σP. In order to analyze the respective incentives to invest, we first have
to define school quality: In the literature, school quality is usually measured by
class size, teacher pay and -training and technological educational inputs such as
classroom computers.3 In our analysis of a school as an institution, which pro-
duces education, we separate the class size aspect of school quality from teacher
pay and -training and technologywhich are subsumed under the term educational
resources.
In the simple model discussed here, we abstract from agency problems between
society, the government, schools and teachers and assume that teachers and schools
act as one, without own interests involved. Since there are no school-specific
3For evidence on the effect of school quality on student learning cf. Card and Krueger (1992) and
Angrist and Lavy (2001, 2002).
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costs, school size does not matter: For simplicity, we may assume that a school
consists of one teacher and one class only. The general trade-off for a school
with a fixed budget per student is that an increase in class size directly decreases
educational attainmant but allows for higher resource spending which benefits
student learning. This tradeoff is illustrated in section 5.2.4 below. In the next two
sections, we first discuss the choice of optimum class size and resource spending
separately.
5.2.2 Class Size Optimization
To determine the optimum class size m, we have to look at the benefit BT and
costs CT of a school, given employed school resources r. The school’s benefit
per class is given by the number of students per class, m, times each student’s
contribution to the social benefit perceived by schools σP:
BT = mσP = mσp
( α
cS
(1− τ) prβ
) α
1−α
rβ. (7)
Note that p = pim.The school’s costs are assumed to be a linear function of its
resources it employs per class. They are given by
CT = cTr, (8)
where cT is a cost parameter. Resource costs consist of the spending for physical
inputs, such as books and coputers, as well as teacher training and salary. Ab-
stracting from the natural condition that class size must be integer, the optimum
class size m can be determined by maximizing a school’s net profit with respect
to class size
m∗ = arg max
m∈R+
{
mσp
( α
cS
(1− τ) prβ
) α
1−α
rβ − cTr
}
.
An increase in class size reduces the time of effective learning in class as well as
the costs per student. From the first-order condition it follows directly that the
optimum class size is given by
m∗ = −
1− α
lnpi
∀pi 6= 1. (9)
We are now able to state two results concerning optimum class size:
Result 1 The optimal class size is larger the better behaved students are.
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Proof.
dm∗
dpi
=
1− α
pi (lnpi)2
> 0.
Result 1 is intuitive: The optimal class size is larger for groups of students who
are well behaved, because these students are less likely to disrupt in class and
therefore benefit less from a class size reduction than more disruptive students.
West and Wo¨ssmann (2003) find that there is indeed sorting of less skilled an
possibly more disruptive students into smaller classes between schools as well
as within schools.4
Result 2 Overall disruption is constant in pi:
dp
dpi = 0.
Proof. Disruption in class is by definition and by equation 9 determined through
the individual disruption probability pi and the elasticity of human capital with
respect to student effort α:
p = pi−
1−α
ln pi .
From this, the result follows directly.
Result 2 also allows for an intuitive interpretation: The school raises class size
until the optimal noise level in the class room is reached. This is the same for
every class because in any case, potential schooling quality5 is multiplied by the
factor that determines actual studying time p. The costs and benefit of changing
the class size m do not depend on how productivity is generated (i.e. on the
students’ effort and the school’s spent resources).
5.2.3 School Resources Optimization
The school not only decides on class sizes, but also about how much resources to
employ. As already discussed above, schooling resources cover physical inputs
to education as well as teacher training and teacher pay. A school’s costs CT and
benefits BT are again given by
CT = cTr (8a)
4They doubt, however, that the kind of model presented here has any empirical relevance, since it
treats schools as unitary actors maximizing educational productivity, thus largely ignoring the interests
of individuals working within schools.
5By potential schooling quality we refer to the schooling quality that would prevail if there were no
disturbance in class, as defined above.
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and
BT = mσP = mpσ
( α
cS
(1− τ) prβ
) α
1−α
rβ, (7a)
respectively. Concentrating all resource terms, we get
BT = mpσ
( α
cS
(1− τ) p
) α
1−α
r
β
1−α .
The school finds optimum resource spending by maximizing its net benefit over
resources,
r∗ = arg max
r∈R+
{
mσ
( α
cS
(1− τ)
) α
1−α
p
1
1−α r
β
1−α − cTr
}
.
The first-order condition is
d
(
BT − CT
)
dr
=
β
1− α
mσ
( α
cS
(1− τ)
) α
1−α
p
1
1−α r
α+β−1
1−α − cT
!
= 0.
By the concavity of the objective function we can solve for r to get optimum
resources as
r∗ =
(
1
cT
β
1− α
mσ
( α
cS
(1− τ)
) α
1−α
p
1
1−α
) 1−α
1−α−β
.
5.2.4 Illustration of the Optimum School Quality Choice
Figure 2 illustrates the school quality optimization problem with fixed student
effort. Class size is displayed on the horizontal axis, school resource spending
on the vertical axis. The solid lines are iso-benefit loci per student in the m-r-
Figure 2
School optimization problem (illustration). 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
space: In order to keep student achievement constant, an increase in resource
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spending can be compensated by larger class size. From (7) we directly get
d B
T
m = 0 ⇔
dr
dm = −
rlnpi
β . The straight dashed lines through the origin repre-
sent iso-cost loci. They result from the per-student cost function C
T
m =
1
m ec
T,
which yields dCT = 0 ⇔ drdm =
r
m . Note that the specification of the education
production function leads to a similar result as with quasilinearity in the produc-
tion function: The optimum value of m is independent of any parameter other
than student characteristic pi and output elasticity with respect to student effort,
α.
5.3 Equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium, when schools and students optimize their con-
tribution to education on their own behalf, resource spending, student effort,
and class size are functions of the cost parameters cSand cT , disruption pi, the
production parameters α and β, the tax rate τ, and the distribution parameter σ.
Result 3 The equilibrium allocation compares to the centralized solution as follows:
m∗ = m#,
r∗ = r# ⇔ (1− τ)α
(
σ
1− α
)(1−α)
= ρ,
e∗ = e# ⇔ (1− τ)α
(
σ
1− α
)(1−α)
= ρ.
Proof. The proof follows directly from a comparison of (10)–(12) in the equilib-
rium allocation with (3)–(5) from the centralized solution:
m∗ = −
1− α
lnpi
, (10)
r∗ =
[(
α (1− τ)
cS
)α ( βm∗σ
cT (1− α)
)1−α
pim
∗
] 1
1−α−β
, (11)
e∗ =
[(
α (1− τ)
cS
)1−β ( βm∗σ
cT (1− α)
)β
pim
∗
] 1
1−α−β
. (12)
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Result 3 can be interpreted as follows: The decentralized optimum class size is
efficient, whatsoever. However, the optimum choices of resource spending and
effort deviate from their first-best values due to three reasons: First, a positive
tax rate τ reduces effort; second, the value of of education, which is perceived by
schools, σ, may deviate from the actual social value of education ρ. With τ = 0
and σ = ρ, there remains a third distortion, which results from the students not
being able to commit to their effort.
The elasticities of the response of student effort e, resource spending r, and edu-
cational achievement P with respect to exogenous variables are summarized in
table 1.
Table 1
Comparative static effects of pi, cS, cT, σ, and τ on optimum e, r, and P.
Effort e Resources r Achievement P
εe,pi = −
1
ln pi
β
1−α−β > 0 εr,pi = −
1
ln pi
1−α
1−α−β > 0 εP,pi = −
1
lnpi
β
1−α−β > 0
εe,cS = −
1−β
1−α−β < 0 εr,cS = −
α
1−α−β < 0 εP,cS = −
α
1−α−β < 0
εe,cT = −
β
1−α−β < 0 εr,cT = −
1−α
1−α−β < 0 εP,cT = −
β
1−α−β < 0
εe,σ =
β
1−α−β > 0 εr,σ =
1−α
1−α−β > 0 εP,σ =
β
1−α−β > 0
εe,1−τ =
1−β
1−α−β > 0 εr,1−τ =
α
1−α−β > 0 εP,1−τ =
α
1−α−β > 0
Themore schools are aware of the total benefit of education for society, the higher
resource spending, student effort, and educational outcome. On the other hand,
the more highly students’ private benefits from education are taxed, the smaller
their incentives to study hard and – by the complementarity of educational re-
sources and student effort – employed resources and achievement. The positive
effect of student behavior on effort, resource spending and achievement cannot
be attributed to better overall classroom behavior, since this is constant over stu-
dent types as shown in result 2. However, since resource spending is a public
good within a classroom, resources are more effectively spent in bigger classes.
By the complementarity of resources and effort, also effort increases in bigger
classes, which results in a better educational achievement.
From the formal considerations presented above, we expect the quality of school-
ing to be highly correlated with educational spending on schooling quality and
not much so with class size because spending directly affects achievement while
the class size effect is just offset by differences in the students’ disruption: Over-
all disruption is constant, notwithstanding the students’ individual behavior.
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While the second expectation is well met by empirical literature6, the effect of
spending on schooling quality, such as teacher quality and physical infrastruc-
ture, is ambiguous: On the one hand, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1998) find
that teacher quality alone accounts for at least 7.5 percent of the total variation in
student achievement; Angrist and Lavy (2001), too, conclude that teacher train-
ing leads to an improvement in test scores. On the other hand, Hanushek (2002a)
in his review finds that increased school spending alone contributes little to bet-
ter student achievement, so do improvements in classroom technology, such as
computer-aided instruction, as pointed out by Angrist and Lavy (2002). Hence,
our model possibly overstates the effect of resource spending r on educational
achievement P.
Hanushek and Wo¨ssmann (2005) find strong evidence that student tracking and
separation by type increases educational inequality. This is concordant with our
finding that employed resources are higher in larger classes with better behaved
students. Since overall disruption in class is constant in the student characteristic,
educational attainment is the higher the better students behave.
6 Student Heterogeneity
6.1 Observable Student Type
So far, we have allowed for differences in student types, but we have always
considered only one type at a time. We proceed by extending the analysis to
the question whether it is socially desirable to segregate between students, i.e.
whether classes should consist of only one category of student types or whether
classes should be mixed. This decision is taken by the government and precedes
the optimizations by schools and students.
There are many different approaches to argue for and against segregation by stu-
dent type. It may be the case that students of a low ability type profit from high
ability types if classes are integrated by being transformed into high ability types
by being around them. This effect of the peer group on transforming behavior is
pointed out and tested in Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001). Their finding is that
children who move from low income areas to higher income areas experienced
6See e.g. Hoxby (2000a) who estimates that class size does not have a statistically significant effect on
student achievement.
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lower behavior problems at school. Another argument in favor of integrated
classes is that integrated classes reduce educational inequality. If students of dif-
ferent types L, H have different probabilities of disrupting in class (low and high,
respectively), piL > piH , L-type students receive more in a mixed class than in an
all L class. Thus, H-type students benefit from segregation and L-type students
may lose by it. However, this argument is controversial: Even L-type students
may profit frombeing in segregated classes if questions asked by H-type students
can be considered disruption as far as L-type students are concerned if they can
not be understood by L-type students.7 In general, one has to be cautious in in-
terpreting disruption since students who interrupt their teachers more might be
more engaged, also benefitting their classmates by raising the value of the edu-
cated experience. As Lazear (2001) points out: “The optimal amount of student
participation is not zero.” Using the narrow meaning of disruption as deterring
the teacher from teaching, result 4 holds.
Result 4 With observable stdent type pi, total expected output and welfare are maxi-
mized if students are segregated by type.
Proof. We stick to the two-type case; it is easily extended to the case of a con-
tinuous distribution of student types. Suppose that the economy consists of χ
H-type students and (1− χ) L-type students. First, assume that all classes are
of the same size m and that student effort e and resources spent r are the same
in each class. Consequentially, also h is uniform across classes. Average achieve-
ment per student with segregated classes is
χpimHh + (1− χ)pi
m
L h. (13)
Since all students in a class share the same behavior, overall probability of dis-
ruption in a class with type pi students is given by pim. Achievement in integrated
classes is
pi
χm
H pi
(1−χ)m
L h. (14)
To show that segregation dominates integration, it suffices to show that the dif-
ference ∆ between 13 and 14 is positive, since the costs are equal by assumtion:
∆ = χpimHh + (1− χ)pi
m
L h− pi
χm
H pi
(1−χ)m
L h. (15)
7A similar argument can be made concerning the segregation between sexes. Betts and Shkolnik
(1999) find that the time spent on discipline falls and that on instruction rises as the class becomes more
female. By the above logic, boys would want to be in all-girl schools, while girls do not want them there.
Also Hoxby (2000b) finds that the gender composition in a class alters classroom conduct.
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When piL = piH , ∆ = 0 because all students are equal. Differentiate 15 with
respect to piH to get
∂∆
∂piH
= χmpim−1H
(
1−
pi
(1−χ)m
L
pi
(1−χ)m
H
)
> 0
for piH > piL. If we allow class size to differ between segregated classes, we can
define m to be the class size that is optimal when student types are mixed. Seg-
regation allows schools to adjust class size for every student type individually,
while segregation dominates even when all class sizes are constrained to be at
the mixed optimum. Therefore, segregation must maximize expected output if
segregated classes can be of different sizes. The same argument is true for the
optimal choices of e and r.
Result 2 shows, that overall disruption is independent of student types. This
result also holds for mixed classes. Thus, learning effort e and resource spending
r depend on class size only. Given any fixed class size, also welfare is maximized
with segregation. If, again, we allow the class size to differ, this can only improve
welfare.
Themore diverse the students’ behavior in class, the more different classes should
exist. As has been shown in result 1, optimum class size is the larger the less dis-
ruptive students are. If students of different types are mixed, the optimum class
size can still be met by looking for the optimum overall noise level in class, which
would be attained more efficiently though if all students in class are of the same
type.8 Result 4 holds for any peer group effect entering the educational produc-
tion function multiplicatively: Also if student characteristics add to learning in
class, which would amount to assuming that pi > 1, segregated classes domi-
nate over integrated classes by the argument given proposition 4.9 In this case,
of course, the temporal interpretation of the peer group effect cannot be main-
tained.
In the preceding section dealing with only one student type, we have implicitly
assumed that classes consist of one student type only, i.e. that student types are
segregated. If the government is maximizing total welfare, it will induce student
8Hanushek and Wo¨ssmann (2005), however, find a tendency for student tracking to reduce mean
performance.
9Of course, pi could then no longer be interpreted as a student’s probability of disruption. pi is the just
a parameter describing individual contributions to learning in class: pi < 1 denotes a negative impact
while pi > 1 adds to classroom performance.
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segregation indeed, such that all previous results remain valid. One problem re-
mains: Our model is not able to represent the empirical finding that educational
resource spending and student achievement are only loosely related, if at all. This
shortcoming of the model will be cured partly once we abandon the assumption
that student types are observable.
6.2 Unobservable Student Type
With observable student types and therefore free sorting, it is optimal to increase
class size with better student behavior. If educational resources are a non-rival
within a classroom, the government is willing to spendmore resources on bigger
classes, thus privileging calmer students. It seems obvious that if student types
are not observable, disruptive students want to mimic well behaved students in
order to profit from their favored treatment. If effort costs are constant over all
student types, dPdpi > 0 which is implied by εP,pi = −
1
lnpi
β
1−α−β > 0 in table 1. In
order to avoid this mimicking behavior, schools can adjust their spending or class
size to induce self-selection among students. We assume that students choose the
accurate class if their expected net benefit from studying is equal in several class
types.
Result 5 If student types are not observable and differ only in their probability of dis-
rupting in class,
(a) the level of educational resources spending must be constant over all classes;
(b) even with the constraint of equal resource spending, segregation still dominates inte-
gration.
Proof. The student selection constraints write as10
BSi (i)− c
Se∗i (i) ≥ B
S
i (j)− c
Se∗i (j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ {L, H}. (16)
In a symmetric equiklibrium and since students are homogeneous with respect
to effort costs, e∗i (j) = e
∗
i (i), we can concentrate on human capital production
in several classes. In order to meet both inequality constraints, the school system
has to assure that
BSi (i) = B
S
i (j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ {L, H}, (17)
10BSi (j) denotes the benefit of student i choosing class j.
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which, by result 2, is only possible if rL = rH . From result 4 we know that segre-
gation maximizes educational at any rate. If classes were supposed to be mixed,
they would be symmetric in expected terms, such that students were a priori in-
different between any two classes such that we can safely assume that they sort
anyway. Hence, segregation is both feasible and superior to integration. The
assertion that there exist no asymmetric equilibria is proved by contradiction:
Suppose that rL 6= rH . Then, by 5.1, also eL 6= eH and
BSL (L)− c
Se∗L (L) ≷ B
S
L (H)− c
Se∗L (H) ⇔ B
S
H (L)− c
Se∗H (L) ≷ B
S
H (H)− c
Se∗H (H) .
Hence, self-selection is not feasible with rL 6= rH .
By inducing self-selection through equalization of resource spending, productive
efficiency is lost, since the marginal benefit of employed resources is different
among different classes. However, since integrated classes are also equal in ex-
pected terms, segregated classes are still superior from a welfare point of view.
Hence, increased total spending in education has only small effects on student
achievement since it must be partly allocated to suboptimal use in order to sus-
tain student selection. These theoretical limitations to efficient resource allocation
in education partly explains the findings of Hanushek (1994, 2001) who finds that
merely increasing spending on education does not necessarily increase student
achievement.
7 Conclusion
In a class, a student who is disruptive or takes up teacher time in ways that are
not useful to other students, and affects the learning of others. Thus, class size
may have important effects on educational achievement. However, the empiri-
cal literature, suggests that class size effects play little or no role. The model in
this paper implies that better students are optimally placed in bigger classes and
that optimal class size crucially depends on the schools’ and students’ reaction to
higher disruption in class. In the case of symmetric information about students’
type, the socially optimal class choice can easily be implemented. However, ac-
cording to this model, there must be a high correlation between educational re-
sources and student achievement which is not present in the empirical literature.
This shortcoming of the model with symmetric information is partly overcome
18
by relaxing the assumption that student types are observable by schools. In or-
der to induce self-selection among students, educational resource spending is
adjusted. This results in a similar educational achievement over all student types
– a result which is well matched by empirical observations.
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